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ARTICLE  
 
Counting and recounting happiness and culture:  
On happiness surveys and prudential ethnobiography 
 
Neil Thin 
 
 
Abstract: The analysis of numerical data from happiness surveys has caught the attention of 
governments, corporations, and public media. It is questionable, however, whether the 
humanistic and empathetic aspirations of happiness scholarship can be well served by numerical 
reductionism unless this is more effectively complemented by ethnobiographical approaches 
which explore how self-ratings emerge from cultural contexts and self-narratives. Happiness is 
imagined, generated, and expressed both through quantification and through stories. In 
scholarship, as in everyday life, we count and recount our blessings. This somewhat neglected 
distinction between numerical and narrative representations of happiness applies to conceptual, 
experiential, and methodological issues. It may help us to understand the social construction of 
happiness in cultural contexts, in conjunction with other distinctions such as those between 
affective and cognitive appraisals, and between hedonic and eudaimonic versions of the good 
life. There are potential synergies between psychometric and ethnobiographical approaches 
which could help us to recover some of the core humanistic values of the ‘happiness lens’, 
namely: empathy (respect for subjectivity); positivity (attention to goodness); holism; a lifespan 
perspective; and consequentialist transparency (making progressive intentions and causal theories 
explicit). Anthropology has good potential to help strengthen these values, particularly by using 
ethnobiography to help us understand what numerical representations of happiness mean. 
 
Keywords: happiness, culture, anthropology, self-reports, quantification, biography, self, 
meaning, suffering 
 
 
1. Introduction: quantitative happiness science and the narrative turn 
Happiness scholars explore how people develop a sense that their lives are good, and sociocultural 
anthropology is about how people become human through the medium of culture. Both have 
quantitative and narrative aspects. Happiness scholars ask ‘how happy are people?’, ‘how does 
happiness happen?’, and ‘in what ways does happiness matter?’. Socio-cultural 
anthropologists, typically keener on story-telling than quantification, nonetheless use vague 
and implicit quantifiers in cultural descriptions and comparisons. Studies of happiness and of 
culture face a common dilemma: the subject matter is extremely general and elusive, and to 
develop conversations about it – let alone study it ‘scientifically’ – we tend to feel obliged to 
simply and reify these abstractions. Culture becomes ‘cultures’ or cultural artifacts, or more 
specific measurable differences between populations. Happiness becomes substantialised in the 
form of aggregate numbers representing people’s self-evaluations. 
At the same time as anthropology (like most social research) took a ‘narrative turn’ in the 
1980s (Bruner, 1984; Sarbin, 1986; Kleinman, 1988), the new ‘science’ of happiness was 
celebrating the countability of this elusive entity that had throughout human history mainly 
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been discussed through narrative (Diener, 1984; Veenhoven, 1984; Argyle, 1987; Myers, 1993). 
Arguably, the biggest story of happiness scholarship has been the global public’s willing 
compliance, worldwide, in this extraordinary exercise in reducing complex self-evaluation and 
life-evaluation to numerical form (Veenhoven, 2012: 454). The sheer bravado of quantitative 
happiness science has been captivating, and even by the early 1980s the proliferation of 
happiness scales and measurements seemed to have facilitated a new ‘science’ of happiness 
(Diener, 1984). But interesting though the numbers and the debates about them may have been, 
in themselves they provide information about happiness that is just as inadequate as numerical 
ratings of symphonies or composers or artists would be as a form of commentary on the arts. 
The time has surely come for us to make stronger efforts to bring happiness scholarship to 
interdisciplinary maturity by integrating numerical analysis with exploration of the stories 
behind the numbers. Anthropology, with its long tradition in empathetic and holistic study of 
culture and experience, is well placed to help in this process, particularly if it continues to 
strengthen its interest in ethnobiography (see e.g. Mathews, 1996; Berthon et al., 2009). 
Happiness scholarship and anthropology both require us to be evaluative while also 
respecting individual and cultural diversities and relativities. Through them, we hope to 
engage empathetically and respect other people’s subjectivity while also retaining enough 
detachment to judge and analyse objectively. In light of these balancing acts it is hardly 
surprising that proponents of these disciplines in their different ways have not been 
consistently empathetic (Thin, 2008; 2012a; 2012b). Yet empathy is arguably a core value of both 
disciplines, both as a methodological principle (while studying psychosocial phenomena we 
ought to try to imagine other people’s feelings and thoughts) and as an intended outcome (we 
should provide understanding that can improve prospects for interpersonal and 
interinstitutional empathy). 
Also, in both these disciplines we are studying long-term emergent processes which are not 
only understood mainly through biographical stories, but are actually to a large extent generated 
through collaborative narrative make-believe. Happiness and culture come into existence 
through conversations and nonverbal interactions. We collude with others to make them 
happen by developing the stories through which we both interpret and shape our experiences 
and our relationships. This means that in doing research into the subjective experience of 
happiness and culture we are engaged in generating the processes we want to learn about. 
Happiness researchers aren’t just capturing information about a pre-existing reality; they are 
participating in people’s construction of what happiness is. In this era of surveys we now think 
of happiness, in part, in terms of scales and of graphs purportedly depicting growing national 
‘gaps’ between happiness and wealth. Although we may worry about deficiencies and losses of 
both culture and happiness, there is a key difference: culture is part of our expected inheritance 
and milieu as humans, whereas happiness is (perhaps increasingly in ‘postmaterialistic’ 
societies) something that we must deliberately generate.  
All of us seem to maintain two quite different modes of understanding and interpreting the 
goodness of our lives: we count (our blessings, our pains, our position relative to our former 
selves or our expectations or significant others, etc.) and we recount our past and our future 
(both introspectively in interior monologues and interactively through conversations and 
expressed narratives). In the social sciences, these quantitative and qualitative modes of 
enquiry and discourse have tended to polarize into antagonistic or at best mutually distrustful 
camps of positivists and interpretivists respectively. Bruner (1986: 12-13) contrasted the 
‚paradigmatic‛ mode of thought (on which logico-scientific rationality is based and which is 
particularly relevant to understanding the physical world), with the ‚narrative‛ mode (which 
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builds on ‘folk psychology’ to explore the plot lines of people’s lives and the mental processing 
associated with them). Although another pioneer of the narrative turn, Sarbin (1986), declared 
that ‚psychology is narrative‛ (p. 8), many scholars prefer to keep story-telling out of the shop 
window, and proceed as if ‘data’ were synonymous with ‘numbers’. Most survey-based 
academic papers give details of the survey instruments and population samples used, but do 
not even hint at the heuristics or thin-sliced self-narratives by which respondents may have 
arrived at their numerical self-evaluations. 
 
2. On scientific reductionism and heuristics 
One branch of positivist scholarship does explicitly recognize that survey self-reports are 
tendentious and partial representations of happiness: Nobel prize-winner Daniel Kahneman 
has for many years drawn our attention to the ‚simplifying heuristics‛ by which people arrive 
at answers to survey questions, which must be put into play because our numerical self-ratings 
don’t come ‚ready-made‛ like names (Kahneman, 1999: 21). Since aggregate scores are 
unavoidably distortive, he recommends a more realistic way of arriving at scores, allowing us 
to measure ‚objective happiness‛ by using less confusing and (for respondents) less 
demanding techniques of momentary wellbeing assessment (Kahneman, 1999: 21). These give 
us a heap of hedonically rated moments which can then be aggregated to provide an overall 
score.  
Fellow psychologist Fredrickson (2000) then pointed out that beginnings, peaks, and ends 
are justifiably salient in our self-evaluations because they are richer in information about our 
life stories and our minds. Since happiness is complex, subjective, and narratively constructed, 
there is no reason to assume that we will get a more valid or useful representation of it by 
treating it as a heap of momentary pleasures. Analogously, it would be questionable to 
evaluate the experience of a Wagner opera by meticulously counting not just its exquisite peaks 
but all of its boring quarter-hours to give an aggregate score. The opera is experienced as a 
whole: its peaks, its structure and its musical narrativity are what matter. 
Kahneman is optimistic that we will soon have developed very much more affectometers 
and hedonimetric techniques for measuring ‚experienced utility‛ (Kahneman, 1999: 18). Even if 
he is right, we’ll still need narratives and other qualitative approaches to conduct responsible 
life evaluation. As the philosopher Anna Alexandrova (2008) has sensibly recommended, we 
ought to make intelligent, context-relevant uses of the different kinds of assessment: 
momentary assessments are helpful in making decisions relating to short-term pleasures and 
pains, but life satisfaction assessments (and, I would insist, not just numbers but stories too) are 
more likely to be helpful for considerations of major life-choices. 
No social sciences escaped the ‘science wars’ that in the 1970s and 1980s seemed to 
exacerbate the ‘two cultures’ fragmentation between positivistic and interpretive approaches to 
studying human sociality. But happiness scholarship, with its combination of a rich variety of 
scientific methods with strong respect for subjectivity and philosophizing, seems well 
positioned to transcend those often unnecessarily adversarial stand-offs. All serious happiness 
scholars, in whatever discipline or school of thought, are forced to reflect on the differences and 
synergies between the generalizing art of measurement and the more idiosyncratic and 
hermeneutic approaches to understanding happiness via life stories. In scholarship, as in 
everyday life, we are all both quantifiers and storytellers. So despite the ideal-type distinction 
between numerical and narrative modes of enquiry and representation, quantitative 
representations of psychological conditions tend to be strongly intertwined with stories, and 
stories frequently rely on implicit quantification for their interest and persuasive power. 
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Indeed, quantitative researchers have long been aware that their numerical analysis is 
potentially misleading without strong appreciation of how nonspecialist respondents use and 
understand the vague quantifiers (such as the highly culture-bound ‘not too happy’ used in 
USA surveys) on which numerical findings depend, especially when those findings are based 
on elicited self-reports (Bradburn & Miles, 1979; Schwartz, 1999; Sanford & Moxey, 2003). 
In happiness studies, the counting metaphor is associated with ‘bottom-up’ approaches in 
which our wellbeing is conceived as a heap of evaluations which can become depressed 
through pains and elevated by pleasures. The narrative metaphor is more likely to support 
‘top-down’, holistic appreciation of life as a complex organic whole in which a master-plot is 
interwoven with a variety of subplots, characters, and dramas. In counting-house mode, life is 
good if the pile is high. It was this elevation metaphor that allowed the poet Robert Frost (1942: 
15) to suggest that ‚Happiness makes up in height for what it lacks in length.‛ If life domains 
are counted separately, you have to either average the height of each pile, or specify some 
weighting according to the salience of each life domain. In narrative mode, life is good if the 
journey is interesting or if we seem at least to be proceeding in a promising direction. In 
counting-house mode, we persuade ourselves that happiness is a matter of factual verification: 
the heap is either high or not. In narrative mode, by contrast, the knowability of happiness is 
much more dubious: happiness can be consigned to the uninteresting happy ending, dangled 
on the end of a stick as an unreachable otherworldly ideal, or conceived as the enjoyment or 
meaningfulness of the journey. Quantified suffering is quite simply a subtraction from the 
heap, but narrated suffering can acquire a critical role in providing the sufferer’s life with 
interesting contrast, with new relationships with sympathetic others, with some existential 
meaning, or with a dramatic plot. 
As in all other sciences that necessarily transcend the naturalistic-hermeneutic division, 
happiness scholars may be tempted to avoid debates about the respective contributions of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. But the discipline as a whole must recognize the 
different strengths of these approaches, and seek constructive synergies between them. Much 
has been made, in many key texts on happiness, of the conceptual parsing of happiness into 
‘affective’ aspects (i.e. how good or bad people feel, emphasized in hedonic approaches taking 
pleasure as the core meaning of happiness) and ‘cognitive’ aspects (i.e. how people interpret 
and evaluate the quality of their lives in more detached and reflective ways, as emphasized in 
eudaimonic approaches taking value, meaning, fulfillment or perfection as the core meaning of 
happiness) (see for e.g. Schimmack et al., 2002; Veenhoven, 2012: 453-4). But the distinction 
between happiness quantified and happiness narrated seems rather more stark, and potentially 
more instructive but also more threatening if allowed to persist as a cultural divide within 
happiness scholarship. Over several decades a colossal effort has gone into debating the 
reliability of various kinds of measures. It is vital that this be matched by more careful debate 
on whether, when, and why measuring is needed, and how the knowledge it generates can be 
rendered more comprehensible and useful through exploration of more sophisticated 
biographical information. 
 
3. Bureaucratic happiness quantification: A product of radical modernity 
It seems likely that humans in all cultural contexts have always used both substantialist and 
narrative metaphors, and consequently both quantification and discursive story-telling, in 
assessing the goodness of people’s feelings and lives. Although 18th and 19th century 
utilitarians made rhetorical declarations in favour of the quantifiability of happiness, it was 
only in the 20th century that people tried to put this into practice in systematic research. John 
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Sinclair, the Scot who invented modern national statistics with the recommendation that their 
core purpose was to establish the ‚quantum of happiness‛ (Sinclair, 1791: xiii), didn’t dare to 
suggest that anyone try to measure subjectivity directly. Bentham (1781/2000, ch. 4), dreamed of 
a ‚felicific calculus‛ and Edgeworth (1881, ch. 3), speculated about the development of 
hedonimetry but neither was bold enough to propose any realistic plans let alone to engage in 
practical experimentation with these ideas. Yet today, it seems to have come to pass that 
humanity is indulging in a unique experiment in persuading ourselves that happiness is, after 
all, measurable. Many people would still accept that life stories have an important part to play 
in understanding happiness, but this is all but forgotten in the public discourse on the science 
of happiness.  
Sometimes, the quantitative and narrative approaches have been combined. For example, 
interesting stories about happiness have been developed on the basis of numbers, as in 
Easterlin’s (1974) hugely influential article which convinced lots of people that there was an 
‘Easterlin paradox’ in the form of an apparent contradiction between the universally positive 
income-happiness correlation in cross-sectional studies (i.e. everywhere richer people’s self-
reported happiness tends to be higher) and the lack of such correlation in many longitudinal 
studies (i.e. lots of nations have seen rising income without rises in self-rated happiness scores). 
Arguably it has been the sheer tellability and newsworthiness of number-based happiness 
stories that has captured the public imagination. In other cases, conversely, numbers have been 
derived from stories, as in the famous study of Milwaukee nuns’ diaries and health records, 
which found the authors of the more optimistic and cheerful diaries to have had better health 
and longevity (Danner et al., 2001). That study emerged from a lucky natural experiment, but 
many other longitudinal cohort studies are now tracking lifespan development of happiness 
and related psychological, behavioural, and situational factors in ways which are genuinely 
going to transcend the quantitative-narrative divide by showing how self-reports relate to 
plans, anticipations, events, and memories (Elliott, 2005, ch. 10; Pavot, 2008: 132). 
The psychologist Sternberg (for decades a global superstar of psychometrics) describes his 
own progression from ‘psychometric’ research on love to a more in-depth, humane, and 
ultimately more revealing and more rational and scientific approach identifying strong cultural 
patterns evident in analysis of personal love stories (Sternberg, 1998: ix-x, 24). Nonetheless, 
Sternberg also took the trouble to subject his theories of story types to empirical psychometric 
testing. Similarly, the number-crunching empirical sociologist Donald Campbell did a total 
about-turn from his 1960s disparagement of case study methods to strong approval of them in 
the 1970s (Flyvberg, 2006: 221). The recent ‘Felicitators’ collection in this journal included 
several biographical papers by scholars who hitherto had specialized mainly in the analysis of 
statistical evidence on happiness (Helliwell et al., 2011). Freedman’s (1978, e.g. ch. 3) review of 
mainly statistical evidence on happiness also humanizes the text by providing semi-fictional 
biographical summaries of composite representatives of ‘happy people’ on the basis of 
interviews.  
Generally, however, the happiness quantifiers – largely social and experimental 
psychologists (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2008; Veenhoven, 2012), neuroscientists (Davidson, 
2004; Hanson & Mendius, 2009) and economists (Frey, 2008; Helliwell & Wang, 2012) – have 
worked quite separately from the happiness story-builders and biographical interpreters – 
largely psychotherapists (Frankl, 1959/1984; Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999; Bernstein, 1990), a few 
narrative psychologists (Bruner, 1986; Baumeister, 1991; McAdams, 2005; Bauer et al., 2008; 
Bauer & McAdams, 2010), philosophers (Haybron, 2008; Bok, 2010), theologians (e.g. Turner, 
2008), and popular self-help and life coaching authors (Riklan, 2004; Swan, 2010). Quantifiers 
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specialise in finding the most efficient and ‘reliable’ means of eliciting self-disclosure. 
Narrativists specialize in interpreting the psychological, social, and cultural complexities of self-
making. 
To anthropologists and to anyone interested in cultural diversity, it is startling to learn that 
despite all the diverse ways of conceiving selves, lives, and happiness, and despite the 
inevitable indeterminacy of all of these in all cultural contexts, most people worldwide are 
prepared and able, when asked, to put a number on their happiness or on the quality of their 
life (Veenhoven, 2012: 454). This ‘step one’ personal aggregation has given birth to an explosion 
of ‘step two’ social aggregation at community and national levels: the survey-based 
aggregation of numerical self-reports has undoubtedly become the dominant emblem of the 
new discipline. It is now clear that in aggregate form, these numbers give us useful information 
that tends to correlate well with other ways of measuring people’s overall happiness, life 
satisfaction, and quality of life (Helliwell & Wang, 2012; Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2008, ch. 14; 
Diener & Tov, 2012: 144; Veenhoven, this issue).  
Treated with due caution, numbers have key roles to play in developing new kinds of 
conversation about happiness, and in checking the plausibility of common claims and 
assumptions about its causes and effects. Though no doubt the merits of scientistic approaches 
to subjective issues are sometimes overstated by their proponents (for a critique of unrealistic 
claims about happiness ‘facts’ see Wilkinson, 2007; and for a critique of unwarranted causal 
claims, see Thin, 2012a, ch. 8), prospects for cumulative and robust knowledge generation are 
surely improved by this insistence on transparent research methods, on clarification and 
refinement of constructs and survey questions, and on systematic comparison with other 
studies (Diener, 1984: 542-3).  
There are nonetheless good reasons to worry about the numerical reification of happiness 
that is shown in the widespread tendency of scholars, media, and politicians to treat numerical 
self-ratings as if they revealed a substantial entity called ‘happiness’. Just as ‘the economy’ is an 
abstraction that takes on a realistic life of its own when measured as GDP, and just as money is 
a symbol of value which gets mistaken for real worth by so-called ‘materialists’, similarly it is 
becoming common to treat happiness – which is obviously highly abstract and ultimately 
indeterminate – as if it were adequately represented by personal and national scores. In typical 
public reports on happiness surveys, the Danish ‘are’ happier than the French, by virtue of 
some portion of their citizenry having awarded themselves higher digits (e.g. Helliwell & 
Wang, 2012: 30, 36, 38, 40-42). North Americans have, according to perhaps the most iconic and 
most common misrepresentation, made no happiness gains since the 1950s (and sometime this 
heroic claim is expanded to ‘the West’ in general, e.g. in Layard, 2005: 29). Parents ‘are’, 
according to most survey reports, less happy than childless people, and these reports according 
to one comprehensive review provide clear ‚empirical evidence‛ that ‚beliefs about 
parenthood and childlessness < are largely false‛ (Hansen, 2012: 49). Such overconfident 
conclusions dismiss out of hand the many interesting debates that might arise through 
confrontations between survey reports and biographical self-reports.  
We are assured on the basis of numerical self-reports that ‚we are generally quite happy‛ 
(Freedman, 1978: 36) or that ‚most people are happy‛ (Diener & Diener, 1996). In the Dieners’ 
paper, the criterion for being ‘happy’ is that you believe yourself to have a ‘neutral’ balance of 
good and bad feelings or of larger satisfactions and dissatisfactions. They assume that the self-
report is the self-evaluation – that people ‘are’ happy if they self-report themselves a 5 on a 0-10 
survey scale. They also assume that people are able, intelligently, to make quantitative 
comparisons between goods and bads such that a ‘unit’ of one cancels out a ‘unit’ of the other. 
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They then assume, more controversially still, that a ‘neutral’ self-evaluation is the point at 
which you can responsibly be described as ‘happy’. But can we really tell when a leg pain is 
neutralized by a musical joy, for example? And if someone says their bad moments are almost 
as frequent as their good ones, or that they are dissatisfied with almost as many aspects of their 
lives as those they are satisfied with, can we reasonably call them ‘happy’? A little more 
conversation, and a bit of story-telling, are needed if we are to make responsible use of such 
survey-based claims. 
 
4. You and your life: Eudaimonism and the mistrust of ‘Hokey Cokey Theory’ 
You put your whole self in, your whole self out.  
In out, in out, you shake it all about.  
You do the Hokey Cokey and you turn around.  
That's what it's all about. [Traditional song, UK] 
An embarrassed and reluctant father dances in and out to the Hokey Cokey at a children’s 
party. ‘I don’t think he’s really putting his whole self in, do you?’ says one onlooker. ‘No,’ says 
another, ‘I don’t think he really believes that the Hokey Cokey is what life is all about, do you?’ 
There are two parts to Hokey Cokey Theory. First, we invent a ‘whole self’, an integrated 
identity which we hope will be a good one, like the ‘good daimon’ from which ancient Greek 
philosophers developed the idea of ‘eudaimonia’, or ‘thriving’; and we then pretend that this 
coherent self gives our life some kind of meaning – ‘that’s what it’s all about’. Sceptical adults 
know this to be always a fragile and provisional invention: we juggle all the time with various 
private and public selves and roles, and we rely on our own feelings, other people’s views, and 
cultural narratives to tell us whether each version is a good one.  
In interaction with other people and with the environment, we develop stories involving a 
variety of tokens which can be deployed as extensions of the self. Picture now a five-year-old 
boy on the pitch-and-putt course, who turns triumphantly to his father, shouting ‘I’m on the 
green and you’re not.’ He demonstrates at that tender age a sophisticated intuition of how the 
self develops through playful self-extensions. Note that he isn’t so immersed in the game that 
he mistakes the ball for his actual self. He is well aware that when he proceeds to the putting 
green it is not his whole self that will plop into the hole. I would assume that respondents to the 
‘all things considered’ global happiness survey question are similarly aware that the self-report, 
like the golf ball or the ‘whole-self-in’ move in the Hokey Cokey dance, is a playful part-self – a 
nanobiography, if you like.  
Promoters and interpreters of happiness surveys don’t consistently show this same level of 
understanding. In order to get conversations going about national happiness, they suspend 
disbelief and treat numerical self-reports as if they were self-disclosures – i.e., revelations of 
actual selves and actual happiness – rather than provisional, temporary self-expressions. In the 
absence of evidence to the contrary we trust, in a general sense, that self-reports refer to 
‘happiness’ or to how well people believe their lives are going. Unless there is evidence of 
systematic distortion, we have no need to worry about occasional rogue responses that are 
given in bad faith, because the aggregate statistics still give a fair if absurdly concise 
representation of aggregate happiness. But to find out what self-reports mean, we need to 
explore how people’s sense of self develops through interactive narration in cultural contexts. 
In doing so, we will learn a great deal about emotion norms, shared narratives, ideal character 
types, aspirations, and norms of self-presentation that will tell us a great deal more about 
happiness than we can learn from numerical ratings. 
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Probably the most tricky demand placed on respondents to happiness surveys is the idea of 
asking them to evaluate, in a detached way, their ‘life-as-a-whole’, or to consider ‘all things’ 
when assessing their current happiness. Such reports, it is hoped, enrich our understanding of 
the multiple dimensions of wellbeing by taking into account the multiple domains that 
respondents hold dear (Rojas, 2003). Respondents presumably recognize some scientific 
purpose in this extreme act of simplification, but there is no reason to make the Hokey Cokey 
assumption that they put their ‘whole self in’ to the numbers they report. Nor indeed is any 
aggregation – from experiences to self-ratings or from individuals to nations – ‘what it’s all 
about’: the concept of happiness begs much more sophisticated conversations than can ever be 
facilitated by the analysis of these numerical reports. Let’s not forget that even book-length 
autobiographies are highly selective in choosing a small set of aspects of the self and life events 
to disclose. This being so, it is clearly absurd to expect the nanobiographies that we get from 
survey responses to be more than partial self-disclosures. Arguably, no such survey evidence 
should be presented alone, without some qualitative enquiries into what the respondents were 
thinking about when they offered the self-ratings. 
To arrive at a single-digit summary of their own happiness or life satisfaction people seem 
able not just to detach their analytical selves from their experiencing selves, but also to 
distinguish their selves (‘I am a happy person’) from their lives (‘my life is going well’). There 
has already been ample debate on the questions of whether people are trustworthy judges of 
their own wellbeing, and whether survey-elicited numerical self-reports are trustworthy 
representations of those self-evaluations and life-evaluations. Much less has been said about 
comprehensibility of the self/life distinction, but the happiness philosopher Dan Haybron 
provides a provocative introduction. He invited his students to consider the case of George, a 
very happy man who bases his happiness on the utterly false belief that people love and admire 
him. Nearly all students agreed that George is ‘happy’, but half of them disagreed with the 
claim that he has a ‘happy life’ (Haybron, 2009).  
I interpret this ‘happy person versus happy life’ distinction as one between hedonic and 
eudaimonic evaluation, and thence between the relatively simple numerical representation of 
pleasure and the much more complex, necessarily narrative analysis of the goodness of 
someone’s life. If George reports a high barometric happiness score we may have no reason to 
disbelieve it. But his life story is one of self-deception, indignity, and vulnerability. The 
nanobiography that a number gives us can actually be seriously undermined by the more 
substantial biography that lies behind it, and none of these comes close to full self-disclosure. It 
may represent mainly or only ill-informed, unsustainable, inauthentic pig-like pleasure of the 
satisfied fool whose life is worse than that of ‚Socrates dissatisfied‛ as J.S. Mill (1861/1957: 9) 
put it. It’s not that animalistic pleasure is intrinsically wrong, it’s that it is a small and – 
according to eudaimonists – ‘lower’ component of all the happiness that there could be in our 
lives. 
Haybron’s example refers to a hypothetical individual and is of tenuous relevance to 
studies of large numbers of real individuals. But it does remind us that most of us require more 
than one-shot barometric self-evaluation to assess how well people live: stories matter too, 
because they tell us about how people’s happiness unfolds over time, how it relates to 
character, and how it emerges from particular social contexts and in response to challenges as 
well as to pleasures. And if one person’s self-evaluation can be deluded, could this not also be 
true of aggregate happiness scores? 
Kahneman (1999) argued in favour of ‚objective‛ (p. 7) happiness assessments based on 
momentary self-evaluations on the grounds that these require much less ‚cognitive 
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integration‛ (p. 19) than is the case with longer and more complex self-assessments such as day 
recollection or life satisfaction because in these more general, cross-temporal senses, people 
‚generally do not know how happy they are‛ (p. 21). It might reasonably be inferred from this 
that scholars who take a ‘hedonistic’ approach to the good life (happiness as pleasure) are more 
likely to be counters, whereas those who insist on ‘eudaimonic’ approaches (the good life as the 
achievement of meaningful self-actualization) are more likely to be narrators. Still, many 
scholars espousing eudaimonic perspectives have shown themselves more than willing to 
subject eudaimonia to numerical reduction, developing scales to measure ‚Psychological Well-
Being‛ (Ryff & Singer, 2008), ‚Self-Determination‛ (Deci & Ryan, 2008), ‚Eudaimonic Growth‛ 
(Bauer & McAdams, 2010), ‚Personal Expressiveness‛ (Waterman 2011: 371), ‚Eudaimonic 
Wellbeing‛ (Waterman et al., 2010), and ‚Meaning-In-Life‛ (Steger et al., 2006). This 
multiplication of measures shows the diversity of this unmanageably residual category of 
‘eudaimonic’ wellbeing. Ironically, researchers seeking to prove that it is qualitatively different 
(and morally superior) to ‘hedonic’ or ‘subjective’ wellbeing often end up simply 
demonstrating only that these various kinds of goodness contribute to a ‘quantitative’ self-
assessment of happiness (for a superb critique of several key eudaimonists, see Kashdan et al., 
2008: 223).  
So no matter what happiness concept forms the basis of self-report measures, we still need 
to investigate self-stories to find out what people’s self-ratings actually mean. When 
eudaimonists use terms like ‘fulfilment’, ‘self-actualization’, and ‘authentic self’, there are a 
host of questionable implicit assumptions concerning ideal selves which people are 
psychological capable of distinguishing from less worthy alternatives. Eudaimonists tend to 
blame self-alienation on life circumstances that inhibit the pursuit of self-actualization (e.g. 
Waterman, 2011:363-4). But the quest to identify and then approximate oneself to this ideal self 
could lead, of course, to endless anxieties about which potential selves we should be trying to 
perfect (Ben-Shahar, 2009). To the extent that it perpetuates self-doubt, Aristotelian 
perfectionism is an ‚inhumane doctrine‛ (Kraut, 1979: 194). 
So although new narratives may help us out of alienation, it may have been excessive 
investment in specific linear projected self-stories that got us into trouble in the first place 
(Becker, 1997). This is not to say that efforts towards self-improvement are necessarily bad. It’s 
hard to imagine how anyone could progress through life without some process of sifting 
through choices to reject activities for which we have no aptitude. But to understand how 
people cope with the unavoidable dilemmas posed by the impossible variety of human 
potentials and goals, we need to appreciate the role that self-narratives play in enabling people 
to develop a sense that at least some of their goals and achievements are good and meaningful, 
or, alternatively, that it doesn’t much matter whether they are so long as the pursuit of them is 
enjoyable and not harmful to others.  
A quantifying, ‘more-is-better’ approach to fulfillment or authenticity won’t do because 
pretending to have a single ideal authentic self is psychologically dangerous. Ideal selves are 
cultural constructions, not pre-existing entities, and they need to be actively constructed 
through personal fictions that are sharable with other people. This is not just a simple process 
of discovering or revealing a ‘real’ self that exists independently of the stories we co-construct 
(Holstein & Gubrium, 2008). Similarly, it has increasingly been argued since the 1980s that 
cultural representations are narratively co-constructed (Tedlock, 1991). Although we can 
measure ‘culture’ when it suits us, what matters is that we appreciate and learn about cultural 
processes. To assess happiness or culture, we need a narrative approach, which explores how 
people’s conversations with other people, their engagements with cultural narratives, and their 
Counting and recounting happiness and culture 
Thin 
 
www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 322 
introspective self-dialogues interact to facilitate or inhibit viable autobiographies. Hokey Cokey 
Theory is problematic for both hedonists and eudaimonists, i.e. to anyone who overinvests in 
either a numerical self-representation or in an ideal self, because there is no ‘whole self’ 
independent of the stories we tell about it. 
 
5. Stop making sense? Meaning and anti-meaning 
Overlapping with the boom in happiness studies, there has been since the 1960s an explosion of 
interest, among philosophers and psychologists, in the concept of meaning-in-life (see e.g. 
Frankl, 1959/1984; Baumeister, 1991; Steger, 2009; Wolf, 2010). Biographies are important 
vehicles for both developing and reporting on the sense in which lives can be meaningful. By 
exploring oral and written narratives from diverse languages and cultures, we can get a sense 
of the common and idiosyncratic root metaphors through which meaning is developed: life as a 
journey; as a stream; as an organic cycle of growth and decline; a puzzle or quest; a vessel; a 
drama or story; a construction process; an investment, and so on. ‘Meaning’ is a vague term, 
but we can usefully parse it to distinguish four kinds of existential ‘meaning’ which biography 
might be said to convey: purpose, communication, order, and justice.  
Purpose is about linking outcomes with plans and anticipating the pleasure of intentional 
achievement. In Western autobiographies, arriving at a sense of purpose is often associated 
with a cathartic crisis or ‚turning point‛ beyond which an individual begins to live what they 
see as their true destiny (Bruner, 2001: 32). Turning points can, however, denote the repression 
of individuality, and its immersion into a new sense of belonging in a set of cultural traditions. 
In Sun Chief, the autobiography of Don Talayesva, a Hopi chief of Arizona, the structure of the 
story depends heavily on the painful initiation rite as a ‘turning point’ at which individualist 
mischief and lack of direction was literally flogged out of him so that he learned to ‚live right‛ 
by obeying elders and respecting ancestors (Simmons 1942: 87). Purpose considerations are 
therefore about personal control and agency, but also about teleology or destiny  the idea that a 
life seems to be leading towards some predefined outcome and that good luck or bad luck 
along the way is somehow ‘meant to be’. 
Communication generates connections between speakers and hearers, between symbols and 
referents, and between the constituent parts of an utterance. By telling a life, we seek 
authentication from an actual or imaginary audience (Gergen & Gergen, 1988). Life reviews 
also try to establish a sense of order, the antithesis of chaos or patternlessness. Order can be 
based on internal consistency (the sense of fit between the different activities, roles, and phases 
of an individual’s life) and external consistency (links between the individual and broader 
patterned environments social, historical, environmental, and cosmological or ‘spiritual’). 
Worldwide, people are interested in the aesthetic quality of individuals’ lives, seeking the sense 
that someone’s life has a good ‘feel’ or ‘pattern’, that it is a good example of a human life, that it 
is not a ‘mess’.  
These ‘prudential’ and ‘perfectionist’ considerations can also be complemented by ethical 
criteria, concerning whether the relations between efforts and rewards in someone’s life seem 
to exhibit justice. When the expected links between efforts and rewards are severed through 
bad luck or enemy action, this is perceived not only as injustice but also as a loss of meaning. 
Violence is ‘meaningless’ (to witnesses and victims, though not necessarily to perpetrators) if it 
lacks a clear sense of purpose and justice. In suffering narratives, it can be tamed by being 
rendered meaningful. Alienation and self-doubt, similarly, can be tamed through narrative self-
justification. It is no accident that many of our early Western autobiographies were called 
‘confessions’ or ‘apologia’ – self-justifications: an interest in conscious choices between diverse 
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human potentials is bound to lead to self-doubt and guilt. As has often been demonstrated 
empirically in recent years, telling or writing down stories about our lives has important 
therapeutic benefits (Myerhoff, 1978; Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999; McAdams, 2005). Presumably, 
they achieve this in part by helping us justify and make sense of crucial life choices that we can 
never be sure were good ones. 
If self-narratives as the means by which people make sense of their lives have so much 
emotional and moral baggage invested in them, you can understand why some researchers, not 
only in the positivist happiness quantification camp but also in qualitative anthropology, have 
chosen to ignore autobiographies as sources of information on happiness and culture. But can 
we really avoid this problem by relying instead on numerical self-reports, which force 
respondents to thin-slice intuitively rather than ponderously? When we make meaning through 
stories, we learn about how adversities can become resources for progress and meaning. So the 
aggregator’s argument, that it is better for a nation to report as much positive affect and as little 
negative affect as possible, may not work at the level of the individual: here, it’s not just the 
arithmetic that matters but the stories make the numerical self-reports possible. 
Biography can serve to describe, celebrate, and highlight any of the above qualities 
(purpose, communication, order, and justice), but is often a key means by which such qualities 
are invented. And the generation of meaning can be done, ironically, through tales of 
disjuncture, alienation, and meaninglessness which are then overcome. What cross-cultural 
biographical studies can offer, potentially, is a sense of whether these various kinds of 
‘meaning’ which have become such prominent concerns in modern Western philosophy are 
similarly evident in the life stories that people tell in diverse cultural contexts, or whether 
different kinds of meaning are emphasized, or whether perhaps the idea that life should be 
meaningful is barely expressed at all. 
First-person perspectives are unavoidably hard to interpret: they are filtered in so many 
ways that many researchers and policy-makers choose to reject them as too distorted, and their 
interpretation and evaluation too morally fraught, to be worthy of policy consideration. What I 
tell a researcher about my satisfactions will in the first place reflect not simply my actual 
feelings and views (which in any case may be highly volatile and uncertain, varying from 
moment to moment and from one encounter to another) but also my preferences for what I 
want the researcher to record about me. This may be distorted in major ways by my 
expectations of what the study ought to report, or by my desire for approval or recognition or 
pity, etc. Even if given a truth drug which forced me to give the most accurate rendition of my 
true feelings, these would in any case be strongly influenced by many factors other than 
objective circumstances. For example, my current life satisfaction reflects my previous 
experiences, my views on what a good life should be like and on what I deserve, my 
expectations for the future, my perceptions of what selected individuals or categories of 
relevant other people have and what I think they enjoy.  
All of these interpretive challenges apply just as much to numerical self-reports. Box 1 
(below) summarises some of the key considerations that we would need to discuss with a 
respondent if we wanted to understand the thinking behind the numerical self-report. 
From this it should be clear that there are great gains to be made from conducting 
ethnographic and biographical enquiries at the same time as doing surveys. This is rarely done 
(although for some examples of mixed-method ethnographic approaches, see Selin & Davey, 
2012). At its simplest, it would involve asking at least a sample of respondents to say, briefly, 
what they had in mind when they rated their happiness or life satisfaction. More adventurous 
work might involve, for example, systematically reviewing large numbers of personal diaries 
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or blogs to identify trends in aspirations, experiential salience, remembrance of the past, and so 
on. This might be done in conjunction with longitudinal surveys to help researchers develop a 
sense of the stories behind the numbers. 
 
Box 1. Variable considerations when thinking about life satisfaction 
Number and variety of domains considered: how many aspects of life are 
thought to matter, and are some more important or salient than others? 
Meaning/interconnectedness of domains considered: is the quality of some 
domains of experience dependent on others? How important is the sense that life 
has some overall coherent meaning or consistent story line? 
Time preference: is the emphasis on the present, the recent past, the distant past, 
or on anticipated future happiness? Do ultra-happy childhoods present a threat to 
the wish to see progressive improvements in happiness through the lifecourse? 
Summative or dynamic: how important, if at all, is the criterion of gradual 
progress from worse to better over time? 
Postmortem welfare: how, if at all, is the assessment influenced by belief in an 
afterlife, or doubts or worries about postmortem rewards and punishments? 
Legacy: how, if at all, is the assessment influenced by thoughts of our postmortem 
influence on the people and places that survive us? 
Self-concept: is a discrete individual the main or only consideration, or do some 
people evaluate their own life satisfaction only as part of a wider collectivity? 
 
6. ‘Happily ever after’: Constraints on happiness narration 
For all its diverse possible referents, happiness is essentially a psychobiographical concept, a lens 
through which we think evaluatively and narratively about people’s selves and lives. The 
enjoyment of life becomes significant, and is culturally legitimated and structured, through life 
reviews and life stories. Oddly, although all humans are interested in how good and how 
meaningful people’s lives are, the stories we tell about lives are rarely prudential (i.e. focused 
on what is good for the person whose life is under consideration). The overwhelming 
impression from browsing published biographical literature is that life stories (oral or written, 
real or fictional) tend to be either heroic and dramatic (focused on unusual achievements and 
struggles) or pathological (focused on exceptional suffering).  
This neglect of the prudential value of stories and events (how good they are for the person 
whose life is being told) is often strongly embedded within narrative traditions which seclude 
happiness in the bland hereafter of the un-narrated happy-ever-after ending and not in the cut 
and thrust of a good narrative. The idea that happy lives should go untold was similarly 
expressed by a Paxtun woman who told the anthropologist Bénédicte Grima ‚I have no story to 
tell: I’ve been through no hardships‛ (Grima, 1991/2002: 53), and before that by Tolstoy’s 
(1878/1954) quip in the first line of Anna Karenina, that ‚all happy families are alike‛. Just as 
Hegel (1822/1975) noted that happiness is on the ‚blank pages of history‛ (or ‚happiness writes 
white ink on white pages‛ as De Montherlant (1958) put it), so in story-telling – fairy-tales, 
fiction, book-length biographies or everyday personal narratives – happiness tends to be 
marginalized or hinted at through other themes such as ambition, success, and love. 
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Pursuers of happiness studies may want to fight this kind of prejudice, and demonstrate 
that many of the most interesting biographical themes are about happiness. But they may also 
learn indirectly about happiness and life meanings from stories about how people struggle 
with adversity and existential doubt. The anthropologist Paul Stoller (2007) notes how among 
intellectuals, himself included, the challenge of life-threatening illness often provokes strong 
desires to express a new sense of awareness of one’s place in the world and of the meaning of 
one’s life: ‚there are, of course, few things more intimate in life than illness. And so it stands to 
reason that illness narratives are widespread‛ (p. 184). It may well be that there is a pan-human 
tendency to appreciate what matters in life through narratives of suffering and deprivation, 
and that – as the phenomenological anthropologist Michael Jackson puts it in his recent book 
on ethnographic approaches to wellbeing, we need to understand this ‚not as a settled state but 
as a field of struggle‛ (Jackson, 2011: 1). 
Biography is not just about reporting and generating meaning for the protagonists of life 
stories. Listening to, narrating, and analyzing life stories are key means for developing 
interpersonal concern and empathy. Life stories are among various ways in which we can show 
prudential interest in the goodness of other people’s lives. Asking and telling about well-being 
is not just expression of pre-existing facts: our happiness, or at least our affective competence, 
requires explicit everyday recognition from other people. Szalai (1980) pinpoints one of the 
paradoxes of wellbeing when he notes that in most cultures there are standardized greetings in 
the form of wellbeing enquiries (‘How are you?’ etc.), yet the expected standard replies to such 
questions (‘Fine’ and/or, reciprocally, ‘How are you?’) don’t necessarily contain any 
information about wellbeing other than that the respondent is well enough to observe this 
social convention. Humans are uniquely and universally concerned about wellbeing and seem 
to believe in the possibility of making and expressing homogenized assessment of the multiple 
domains of wellbeing. But we don’t generally follow this concern through to careful 
interpersonal, intertemporal, or cross-cultural wellbeing comparisons. Just as narrative 
traditions discourage interest in happiness, so too the conventions of interpersonal dialogue 
make it hard to include substantial attention to wellbeing in normal conversation. 
Although our identities are closely intertwined with the ways in which we communicate 
our moods and emotional dispositions, anthropological studies of identity have rarely ventured 
into consideration of the emotional implications of the communication and formation of 
identities. But humans need other people to recognise not just the various cognitive aspects of 
our identity (ethnicity, gender, age, etc.) but the affective aspects too. Identities depend on 
intersubjective negotiation: they are generated through interaction, recognition, and perhaps 
above all by narration. 
Biographical story-telling seems a particularly suitable place to develop engagements 
between anthropology and happiness studies. Through such engagements, anthropology could 
become more cheerful and realistic, while happiness studies could become less ethnocentric, 
more holistic, and better informed by qualitative analysis and ethnographic research. 
Anthropologists, psychologists, psychotherapists, and philosophers all make substantial use of 
life histories, life reviews, and self-narration. But ethno-biographers still exhibit biases which 
inhibit the exploration of happiness. An adequate representation of society conveys some sense 
of how people experience life and find meaning in it, and of how these experiences and 
meanings have changed. In his pathbreaking book Illness Narratives (1988), the foundational 
text in the anthropology of suffering, Kleinman rightly criticizes modern medical practitioners’ 
inattention to the ‚experience of illness‛ (p. xiv). His own unremittingly pathological work, 
however, like that of most of his colleagues in medical and psychological anthropology, can by 
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the same token be criticized for its almost total lack of interest in the experience of happiness. 
Kleinman’s more recent biographical work What Really Matters (2006) makes his own existential 
pessimism more explicit. He tells life stories of a few exceptionally tormented individuals, and 
concludes that ‚what really matters‛ is ‚facing up to our existential condition‛ (Kleinman, 
2006: 231). To Kleinman and his interviewees, this means resignation to life’s awfulness. He 
does fleetingly acknowledge the place of ‚joy, exuberance, and fulfillment <love and hope‛ 
(Kleinman, 2006: 13) and suggests that by making sense of traumas and finding dignity and 
meaning, we may achieve a kind of ‚quiet liberation‛ (p.10) despite a nagging sense of 
hopelessness. Still, life is, for Kleinman, basically miserable. As noted above, Jackson tries to 
make a virtue out of the miserabilist outlook in trying to make sense of the lives of traumatized 
West Africans (2011), and there is now a thriving industry in ethnobiographies of suffering (e.g. 
Nash, 1992; Reed-Danahay, 1997; Das et al., 2001; Grima, 2002/1991; Biehl, 2005; Biehl, Good, & 
Kleinman, 2007; Mattingly, 2010). 
 
7. Conclusions: The happiness lens in positivist, ethnographic, and biographical research 
As I have argued previously (Thin, 2012a: ch. 1) the ‚happiness lens‛, i.e. the most morally and 
intellectually compelling principles and values of happiness scholarship, can usefully be 
spelled out as five qualities:  
1) empathic respect for subjectivity (showing an interest in people’s feelings) 
2) positivity (paying attention to goodness, so as to offset the normal social science bias 
towards pathologies) 
3) holism (exploring ‘whole lives’ by looking at how the various domains, inputs, events, 
and processes interact) 
4) a lifespan perspective (exploring ‘whole lives’ through time, by enquiring into their 
narrativity – how they are anticipated, experienced, remembered, and communicated in 
both internal conversations and externalized self-stories). 
5) consequentialist transparency (an acceptance of the responsibility to explain how we 
expect our values, institutions, and activities to translate into good lives – i.e. making 
explicit our implicit happiness theories). 
 
These principles and objectives are easy to assert, but do our methods and the themes we 
explore actually help us pursue and exemplify these principles in action? Theoretically, 
happiness surveys promote all of these values: they elicit first-person perspectives on the 
goodness of life, which are then analysed so as to develop and test causal theories of the 
interaction between happiness and various factors. Yet it is ironic that happiness scholarship 
has largely come to public attention via survey findings, since these are surely the least 
empathetic, most reductionist, and most decontextualizing and temporally blind of social 
research methods. Scientific detachment is required of the surveyor, while the respondents are 
required to meekly answer the restrictive questions which either show no interest in the content 
of their happiness, or do so in a piecemeal fashion with no attention to narrative happiness. 
Respectful of the first-person perspective to the point of naivety, the happiness quantifier is 
interested in whether your glass is half full but refuses to listen to your stories about what’s in 
the glass and how it got there. Positivist happiness derives from ‘humanistic’ psychology, but it 
has sacrificed too much of its humanity and philosophical plausibility in order to grab our 
attention by reducing happiness to a thing-like, countable entity that seems systematically 
comparable across time and space (Annas, 2004).  
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Anthropology, by contrast, generally favours ‘participant observation’ methods which 
deliberately promote empathy between researchers and informants. The key source of 
anthropology’s best potential contributions to quality-of-life studies lies in the intimacy of 
primary research encounters. In theory at least, these promote a strong sense of empathy with 
research subjects, a humane respect for subjective viewpoints, and a capacity for observing how 
life narratives and aspirations emerge from socio-cultural contexts. As Edgerton (1990) has 
argued, longitudinal ethnographic research allows us to understand better how wellbeing 
emerges over time in relational ways. Anthropological intimacy and empathy, when they are 
emphasized, put anthropology in stark contrast to the conscious avoidance of these in 
experimental psychology and behavioural economics, and to the less deliberate intimacy-
inhibiting use of survey tools by social psychologists and sociologists. However, in recent years 
the trend has been for anthropologists to seek out people who are sufficiently miserable for 
them to sympathise with, and by systematically ignoring happiness most anthropologists 
demonstrate in practice a significant form of empathy failure. 
Table 1 (below) sketches out some of the different ways in which, as I hope I have 
demonstrated above, the core principles and values of happiness scholarship are promoted or 
inhibited by various cultural features of positivist happiness science, socio-cultural 
anthropology, and biography. 
Finally, it is worth considering the implications of these discussions for policy and practice. 
In the final section on policy in the first World Happiness Report, the authors (all economists) 
argue that it is ‚highly desirable that happiness be measured by firms, communities, schools, 
hospitals and even medical practitioners. This will permit a more rapid increase in knowledge 
about the sources and consequences of happiness.‛ (Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2012: 94). 
While it is clearly desirable for all of these institutions to be guided by good understanding of 
the causes and effects of happiness, this recommendation seems unduly optimistic in its 
assumption that these kinds of institution could in general make responsible use of quantitative 
methods. Except in the largest kinds of firm that could afford to hire in expertise and conduct 
reliable large-scale surveys or other numerical observations, it seems likely that quantitative 
methods could at best be used as a very rough way to start conversations about a variety of 
satisfactions. By contrast, any organization of any size, even ones with no social scientists, 
could reasonably be expected to make good use of qualitative research on happiness: anyone 
with basic social skills and empathic awareness can get other people to provide instructive 
stories about their sources of satisfaction, dissatisfaction, meaning, and motivation. 
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Table1. Happiness in positivist, ethnographic, and biographical approaches 
 
Positivist Happiness 
Science 
Sociocultural anthropology Biographical studies 
Empathy and 
subjectivity 
Empathy promoted by 
showing respect for 
people’s own views on 
their wellbeing and its 
causes; but inhibited by 
over-reliance on survey 
and experimental 
methods. 
Empathy promoted by 
intimate long-term participant 
observation, allowing 
respondents to express 
themselves at length, and by 
encouraging self-reflexive 
auto-ethnography; but 
inhibited by lack of interest in 
happiness. 
Empathy promoted 
through the rhetoric of 
personal stories with 
strong plots, 
psychobiographical 
observations, and 
engaging plots; but 
inhibited by lack of 
interest in happiness. 
Positivity Core interest in happiness 
and the good life is the 
key strength and novelty 
of happiness scholarship. 
In some survey 
approaches, too little 
respect for eudaimonic 
happiness. 
Until recently, no systematic 
interest in happiness, strong 
pathological bias, plus some 
naively romantic celebration of 
nonwestern virtue and 
happiness. 
Strong emphasis on 
positive strengths, virtues, 
and success, but little 
systematic interest in 
happiness. Psycho-
biographies and socio-
biography tend to have 
strong pathological bias.  
Holism Strong interest both in 
developing summative 
indices of whole-life 
wellbeing plus exploring 
domain-specific 
wellbeing. Limited 
exploration of how these 
are woven together 
through personal and 
cultural narratives. 
Holism has always been a key 
value and strength of 
anthropology, though 
sometimes inhibited by 
excessive social 
constructionism and 
downplaying of somatic and 
psychological factors. 
Key strength of biography 
lies in showing how 
temporality, emplotment, 
characterization, and 
meaning-making work 
together to formulate 
coherent or meaningful 
lives and selves. 
Lifespan 
perspective 
Downplayed in cross-
sectional surveys but 
getting more attention 
through longitudinal 
studies 
Crosscultural varieties and 
commonalities in the 
structuring of the life course is 
a key theme, along with 
ritualisation of life crises and 
transitions. Was in the past 
inhibited by atemporal 
snapshot representations of 
social reality, but is 
increasingly strengthened by 
ethno-biography.  
Lifespan development is a 
key theme in biographical 
studies, though typically 
the individualist-
hagiographic approach 
inhibits attention to 
cultural and social 
structuring of the life 
course. 
Consequen-
tialist 
transparency 
Clear recognition that 
happiness is at the core of 
‘what really matters’. 
Weaker attention to causal 
theories, particularly due 
to sloppy causal 
inferences on the basis of 
correlational evidence. 
Limited (and sometimes 
pathological) attention to the 
‘what really matters’ question, 
and evaluative analysis is 
inhibited by tradition of anti-
western/anti-modern cultural 
relativism 
Good representation of 
personal values and 
personal theories of how 
things turn out. Tends to 
be weaker on contextual 
analysis of socio-cultural 
causality. 
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